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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Misty Buhler appeals from her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Buhler challenges the denial of her suppression motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The district court found the following facts:
At approximately 10:17 P.M. on Saturday night May 29,
2010 Officers Sylvester[1J and Hayes responded to two silent
alarms in a commercial mall near the Snake River Canyon in Twin
Falls. The mall houses the Best Buy, Old Navy, T.J. Maxx and
Sportsman's Warehouse businesses. Hayes arrived at the scene
first. He checked the back and front doors of the Old Navy building.
Finding nothing amiss he concluded that these were "false" alarms
and was proceeding to complete a false alarm report when dispatch
advised that an employee of T.J. Maxx advised that there were
three vehicles parked next to the T.J. Maxx store. These vehicles
had been there for approximately 45 minutes.
Hayes did not observe any other vehicles in the parking lot
of the mall except for these three vehicles. He was aware of
several burglaries in Twin Falls where the buildings had been
entered from the roof. Hayes suspected that a similar burglary may
have occurred at Old Navy and he decided to investigate the
occupants of the three vehicles as possible suspects. He parked
his patrol vehicle behind one of the vehicles and began talking with
Buhler who was in the rear seat of a vehicle driven by Mike Wilson
who was in the driver's seat. Buhler's vehicle was immediately
adjacent to Wilson's. Buhler's minor child was asleep in the rear
seat of her car. The third vehicle was occupied by an acquaintance
of Wilson and Buhler.
Officer Sylvester [sicJ arrived and parked his patrol vehicle
behind another of the vehicles. The placement of the patrol
vehicles effectively blocked the three vehicles from leaving. Hayes
She
contacted Buhler and asked her what she was doing.
responded that she had been shopping at T.J. Maxx and now was
1

The correct spelling is "Silvester." (Tr., p. 51, Ls.

1

just visiting with [Wiison 2J. As that conversation was occurring
Sylvester [sic] made contact with [Wilson]. [\/Vilson] was nervous
and fidgety and appeared to be hiding something. [Wilson] was
ordered out of the vehicle and after he reached toward the center
console was forcibly removed from the vehicle and handcuffed.
Buhler verbally protested the officer's actions in removing [Wilson}
from the vehicle.
Both officers immediately suspected "drug
activity" because it appeared that [Wilson] was hiding something
and because they found it unusual for Buhler to be in the back seat,
as opposed to the front seat, if the parties were only engaging in
conversation. Both officers testified that their observations and
conclusions were consistent with drug transactions they had
previously observed.
Buhler was ordered out of the vehicle and handcuffed "for
officer safety." She was patted down. No incriminating evidence
was found as a result of this search. While this was occurring
Sylvester [sic] obtained consent from [Wilson] to search his vehicle.
Upon doing so he found marijuana on the driver's seat floor and on
the floor in the back seat. Buhler was then asked whether there
was anything illegal in her car. She responded "no." Hayes asked
if he could search her car and testified that she responded that "it
was messy but it would be fine." Buhler testified that she actually
said that she was not "comfortable" with a search. The Court finds,
however, that she did not expressly refuse to allow a search of her
car. The State concedes that the occupants of all three vehicles
were seized for Fourth Amendment purposes as a result of the
officers blocking the exit of these vehicles.
(R., pp.62-63.)

The officers found methamphetamine in Buhler's purse in the car. (R., p.
16.) The state charged Buhler with possession of a controlled substance. (R.,
pp.31-33.) Buhler filed a motion to suppress alleging the officers were without
cause to initially detain her, that officers had interrogated her in violation of her
Miranda rights, that the search of her car was unauthorized by any exception to
the warrant requirement, and anything ultimately seized should be suppressed as

2

Although the district court uses the name "Miller" at several points in Its opinion,
from context it appears that the court meant Mike Wilson, the other occupant of
the car in which Buhler was first seen.
2

fruit of the poisonous tree. (R., pp.39-48.) Following a hearing on the motion,
the district court denied Buhler's motion to suppress the physical evidence seized
from her car. 3 (R., pp. 61-69.) Specifically, the district court first found that "the
initial seizure was reasonable" based upon suspicion of burglary or drug-related
activity.

(R., pp. 64-65.)

The district court did find that Buhler had been

subjected to an illegal frisk, but that no evidence had been obtained thereby. (R.,
pp. 65-66.) The court further concluded that "Buhler did consent to the search of
her vehicle" and "Buhler's consent to search her car was not acquired by
exploitation of the

illegal

pat down,

but

rather

by

means sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." (R., pp.66, 67-68.)
Buhler entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.
(R., pp.73-75, 81-90; Supp. Tr., p.4, L.13 - p.9, L.15.)

The court sentenced

Buhler to a four year unified sentence with two years fixed, suspended that
sentence and placed her on supervised probation for a period of three years.
(R., p.120; Supp. Tr., p.22, L.16-p.23, L.11.)

Buhler timely appeals. (R., pp.127-130.)

3

The district court did suppress statements made during the custodial
interrogation that preceded the giving of Miranda rights. (R., pp. 68-69.)
3

!SSUE
Buhler states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence?
(Appellant's brie( p. 2.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Buhler failed to show that the district court erred in denying her
suppression motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Buhler Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying Her
Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the evidence ultimately found in Buhler's

purse was found pursuant to a consensual search, rejecting Buhler's claims that
she did not consent, that her consent was given in the course of an illegal
detention, and that her consent was tainted by other illegality. (R., pp. 63-69.)
Buehler challenges each step in the district court's analysis. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 2-8.) Buhler's arguments fail. Application of the correct legal standards to
the facts demonstrates the district court correctly concluded Buhler was not
entitled to suppression of the physical evidence found in her car.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 4856, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306,309
(2004). Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact, the
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds,
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008).

"Findings will not be

deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the
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record." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256

State v. Jaborra,

143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

r'-'·

Buhler Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Finding That
Buhler Consented To The Search Of Her Car And Purse
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not violate

the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)
(citations omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057
(2003); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). Consent is
valid if it is free and voluntary.

Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 225-26 (citations

omitted). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a question of fact to be
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.

Varie, 135 Idaho at

852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49). In order to be valid,
consent cannot be the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248. The mere presence of officers asking for consent
to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute improper police duress
or coercion.

See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

Instead, the

court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent
involuntary only if "coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a
claim of lawful authority .... " State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d
17, 22 (1983) (emphasis original) (quoting Bustamante, 412 U.S. at233).
The district court found that, after officers found marijuana in both the front
and rear passenger areas of Wilson's car, they asked Buhler for consent to
search her car.

(R., p. 66.) "Based on the evidence presented at hearing the

6

Court concludes that Buhler did consent to a search of her vehicle." (R., p. 66.)
This finding of fact is amply supported by the record. (Tr., p. 29, L. 18 - p. 31, L.
6; p. 62, L. 12 - p. 64, L. 13.)
Buhler argues that because the district court made the factual finding that
she did not deny permission that the court applied an incorrect legal standard.
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

This argument is misleading.

In her motion Buhler

claimed that she "raised objections" to a search of her car and the search
occurred "over her objection." (R., pp. 41, 46.) In her supporting affidavit she
asserted, "When officers requested consent to search my vehicle, I objected .... "
(R., p. 50.) In its findings of fact the district court specifically rejected this claim,
finding that Buhler "did not expressly refuse to allow a search of her car." (R., p.
63.)

The district court subsequently also found that "Buhler did consent to a

search of her vehicle" and correctly stated the law relating to consent. (R., pp.
66-67.) It is hardly surprising that the district court made a factual finding on one
of Buhler's factual claims, and Buhler's attempt to characterize the factual
rejection of her claim that she affirmatively objected to the search as instead an
application of an incorrect legal standard is belied by the record.

Buhler has

failed to show error in the district court's determination that she consented to the
search.
1.

Buhler's Consent Was Not Tainted By An Illegal Detention Because
There Was No Illegal Detention

"A consent to search that is given during an illegal detention generally is
tainted by the illegality and is ineffective." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644,
181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). Here the district court determined that the

7

consent was given during the course of a legal detention.

(R., pp. 63-65.)

Application of the relevant legal standards shows no error.
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted). Under Terry, an investigative detention must be
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). The
"reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408,
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951.
"An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496,
198 P.3d at 134 (citations omitted). 'There is no rigid time limit for determining
when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider
the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as
well as the duration of the stop."

kl

The court must also consider whether the

officer's observations during the encounter "and events succeeding the stop"
gave rise to "legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further
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investigation" which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes.
Id.
Here, the district court found unpersuasive Buhler's argument that the
initial seizure was constitutionally impermissible:
The Court agrees with the State's concession that there was
a seizure, but does not agree that it was unreasonable. Buhler
asserts that the mere fact that the vehicles were parked for 45
minutes in a parking stall does not give rise to the suspicion of
criminal activity. The Court agrees that this one fact would support
the defendant's position. But there are additional facts which
objectively lead to the suspicion of criminal activity. The cars were
parked adjacent to buildings where there were burglar alarms
activated. The vehicles were observed after the stores closed.
There were no other vehicles in the vicinity. Though not illegal it is
not normal to have vehicles parked for this length of time after
stores close. While [the officers] parked their vehicles in such a
manner as to block the vehicles [sic] exit, they did not approach the
occupants unreasonably to investigate whether the occupants were
involved in a burglary.
(R., pp.64-65.)

Buhler argues on appeal that once law enforcement made

contact with Buhler and Wilson, "there was no testimony of any sort of
independent factors constituting a probable cause or even reasonable suspicion
regarding" her which would have allowed for her detention.
p.4.)

(Appellant's brief,

"The only independent fact concerning" herself, Buhler argues, "was her

location in the vehicle." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Although Buhler would have this
Court look at that factor alone in determining the existence of reasonable
suspicion, that is not the test.
Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a
citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v.
Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). Although a
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series

facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warra;rt

further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913,
917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Buhler was not detained simply because
of her location in Wilson's vehicle.

Police initially responded to a burglary call.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.4-16 (testimony of Officer Hayes, first officer on scene).)

After

finding no visible means of entry, the call was initially thought to be a false alarm.
(Tr., p.10, L 13 - p.11, L.19 (testimony of Officer Hayes that he began to fill out a
false alarm report).) When the police received additional information about three
vehicles in the otherwise empty parking lot for an extended period of time after
the close of the stores (Tr., p.11, L.22 - p12, L.2) coupled with previous
knowledge of store burglaries occurring from rooftops (Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13,
L.16.), they further investigated those three vehicles.
Upon approaching the vehicles, Buhler was observed seated in the rear of
a vehicle with Wilson in the driver's seat of the same vehicle. (Tr., p.16, L.23 p.17, L.3.)

Wilson was "very nervous, very fidgety" (Tr., p.20, Ls.18-19) and

began to "stuff his hands down towards the center console of the vehicle" (Tr.,
p.20, Ls.19-20) causing both officers to feel concern that he was reaching for a
weapon (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-24 (testimony of Officer Hayes that his concern was the
driver was "reaching for a weapon or anything that could possibly harm us at that
time); Tr., p.56, L.s25 - p.57, L.5 (testimony of Officer Silvester that he "got
nervous because [he] thought [the driver] was trying to hide something from [him]
and [his] first thought was that it was a weapon").) The officers' concern for their

,f ~.

iU

safety based on their observations of the driver's actions was coupled with what
appeared to be indication of a possible drug deal in progress:
It raises red flags as far as drug activity that we normally see as far
as people being in the locations that they are, very dark, with the
defendant sitting in the back seat, we assumed there might be
some type of narcotic drug deal going on at this time.
(Tr., p.24, L.s18-23 (testimony of Officer Hayes).) As the district court correctly
determined based on a totality of the circumstances, the officers developed
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which justified an extension of the
original detention:
[The driver's] actions as describe [sic] above would lead an
experienced police officer to have a reasonable suspicion of drug
activity for the reasons articulated by both officers at hearing. It
was permissible to remove [the driver] from the vehicle for both
officer safety and to further investigate the alleged drug activity. It
was likewise permissible to remove Buhler from the vehicle.
(R., p.65 (citation omitted).)

The district court's determination there was reasonable suspicion to detain
Buhler and the others on suspicion of burglary was supported by the evidence
and the law. They were in close proximity to where burglar alarms went off; there
had been a rash of burglaries where access had been gained through the roof;
and there were no ascertainable reasons why three people in three cars would
be present in the parking lot after hours when the stores were closed.
Reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity was then developed after the start
of the encounter when police observed Buhler's unusual location in Wilson's car
and Wilson's unusual reactions to the police presence, culminating in the
discovery of marijuana near both Wilson's and Buhler's locations in Wilson's car

11

on a consensual search.

Because

discovery of marijuana in

car there was certainly reasonable suspicion at the time of the consent,
the district court properly concluded that the entire encounter was supported
by reasonable suspicion. Because the district court's determination is supported
by the facts and the law, and because Buhler's argument ignores most of the
facts of this case, Buhler has failed to show error in the district court's
determination that her consent was not tainted by an illegal seizure.

2.

Buhler's Consent Was Not The Fruit Of The Illegal Frisk For
Weapons

The district court determined that officers did not have reason to believe
Buhler was armed and dangerous, and therefore officers improperly frisked her
for weapons.

(R., pp. 65-66.)

The court went on, however, to conclude that

Buhler's consent was not tainted by the improper frisk. (R., pp. 66-68.) Buhler's
merely conclusory argument that consent was tainted (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8)
notwithstanding, application of the relevant law to the facts shows that the district
court properly concluded that officers did not obtain Buhler's consent to search
by exploitation of the prior frisk.
Not "all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have come to light but for illegal actions of the police." Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). "Rather, the more apt question in such a
case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."

let at 488

(dtations and quotations omitted). "There are three factors for a court
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to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has
attenuated:" (1) the amount of time that has elapsed

naTI,AU;;,c::,n

adequately
the misconduct

and the acquisition of the evidence;" (2) whether there were intervening
circumstances; and (3) "the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action."
(2004).

State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459

Not all of these factors must be resolved in favor of the state before

evidence will be deemed not subject to the exclusionary rule.

State v.

Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). 'The test
only requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the factors, viewed
together, in order to determine if the police exploited an illegality to discover
evidence."

kl (citing

United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549-550 (4th Cir.

1998)).
Here the district court applied the correct legal standards. (R., pp. 66-67.)
The facts it applied this law to included that consent to search was requested 20
to 30 minutes after the frisk; the officer's conduct at all times was not egregious
but instead "cooperative and cordial" and without any intimidation; officers did not
conduct the pat-down with the ulterior motive of obtaining evidence; and the
discovery of marijuana in Wilson's car was an intervening circumstance that was
the actual reason why consent was requested.

(R., pp. 67-68.)

"In weighing

these factors this Court concludes that the [sic] Buhler's consent to search her
car was not acquired by exploitation of the illegal pat down, but rather by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." (R., p. 68.) The

13

the district court correctly conduded that the consent was
obtained and was not the result of exploitaUon of the frisk.
Buhler's Argument That Physical Evidence Should Be Excluded For
A Miranda Violation Is Directly Contrary To Applicable Law
The district court found a Miranda violation and suppressed Buhler's
statements made before she was informed of her Fifth Amendment rights. (R.,
pp. 68-69.) Buhler argues that she was entitled to suppression of the physical
evidence found in her car because her "consent occurred during the time that an
illegal interrogation was occurring." (Appellant's brief, p. 8 (emphasis original).)
The legal support Buhler cites for this argument is State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144
Idaho 703, 169 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 2007).

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)

This

argument fails at the most fundamental level, however, as it attempts to invoke a
Fourth Amendment remedy for what was not a Fourth Amendment violation.
In Zapata-Reyes the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant
had been subjected to an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Idaho at 709, 169 P.3d at 297.

144

It thereupon applied the Fourth Amendment

remedy of the exclusionary rule, rejecting the state's argument that consent
removed the taint of the illegal seizure.

.1fl

Miranda rights, however, flow not

from the Fourth Amendment, but from the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966); see also Howes
v. Fields,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189-92 (2012) (Miranda rights are
designed to protect against coercion of waiver of Fifth Amendment rights inherent
in custodial interrogation). Because the right against self-incrimination protected
by the Fifth Amendment is not offended by the admission of physical evidence,
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suppression of physical evidence is net a proper remedy for a Miranda violation.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004).

Buhler's request for a

Fourth Amendment remedy for a Mliranda violation is therefore directly contrary
to applicable law.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Buhler1s motion to suppress.

Dated this 3rd day of April 2012.

N COLE L. SCHAFER.
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Deputy Attorney Gen~ral
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